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Prior to the Criminal Code of 1942 a person who obtained
property by false representations as to future facts was not
criminally responsible for the misrepresentations.' Article 672
of the Criminal Code not only combined all the 9tealing offenses
in one crime of theft, but it also broadened the coverage of that
crime.8 In the fraudulent pretense type of offense it covers the
taking "by means of fraudulent conduct, practices or representa-
tions." In State v. Dabbs4 defendant, a used car dealer, pur-
chased three cars with a draft payable two days from date, know-
ing at the time that he did not have sufficient funds in the
drawee bank to cover the draft. In defense to a theft charge,
defendant contended that the drafts were mere promises to pay
in the future, and hence the crime of theft was not made out.
The Supreme Court had little trouble in holding that the giving
of the drafts, even though it amounted to a representation of
future facts, was a fraudulent conduct or practice as denounced
by the theft article. Therefore, the defendant's conviction of
theft was upheld. It was also held that a custom of used car deal-
ers to make purchases with drafts which were not covered with
sufficient funds at the time they were drawn would be no de-
fense. It was said that custom cannot justify a violation of the
Criminal Code.
Aggravated Battery
The Supreme court, in In re Glassberg,5 reversed a juvenile
court's determination that a thirteen year old boy was a delin-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, with B. Lloyd Magruder as
research assistant.
1. State v. Colly, 39 La. Ann. 841, 2 So. 496 (1887) ; State v. Antoine, 155
La. 120, 98 So. 861 (1924).
2. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
3. Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LOUISIANA LAw REvimw 6, 37-38
(1942) ; L.S.A.-R.S. 14:67, Reporter's Comment, at 358 (1950).
4. 228 La. 960, 84 So.2d 601 (1955) ; noted in 16 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW
807 (1956).
5. 230 La. 396, 88 So.2d 707 (1956).
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quent in that he had committed aggravated battery by shooting
a girl playmate in the face with a rifle. The court found, from
an examination of the record, that the "pointing of the gun in the
general direction of Miss Claire and the discharging of it with
the resulting injury were wholly accidental acts." Thus, there
was no general criminal intent which is a necessary element of
the crime of aggravated battery., While criminal negligence in
handling a loaded gun might be the basis of a charge of negli-
gent injuring,7 it could not supply the general criminal intent
which is an essential element of aggravated battery. In dismiss-
ing the proceedings, Justice Hamiter pointed out that the court
could not be sure that the same action (placing the defendant on
probation for three years) would have been taken if the boy had
been adjudged a delinquent on the basis of having committed
the much less serious offense of negligent injuring.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Grand Jury - Secrecy of Session
Prior to the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure the
Supreme Court in State v. Louviere8 held that the presence of a
stenographer at a grand jury session "was no more prejudicial
to the accused than if the same testimony had been recorded on a
phonograph or other mechanical device; and surely, that would
not prejudice the accused or suffice to violate the finding of the
grand jury."9 Article 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
maintained the secrecy of the sessions of the grand jury, but
expressly allowed the district attorney and a sworn stenog-
rapher, who was to record the testimony, to be present during
the sessions. In State v. Howard'0 the Supreme Court had occa-
sion to test the correctness of the dictum in the Louviere case
that the transcribing of testimony taken at a grand jury session
did not violate the secrecy of the session. In holding that the
secrecy of the grand jury sessions which Article 215 secures was
not invaded by the recording of testimony, Justice Moise pointed
out that there was no showing that any unauthorized person ap-
peared before the grand jury or that anyone who had not taken
the oath of secrecy transcribed the recorded testimony.
6. LA. R.S. 14:33 and 14:34 (1950).
7. LA. R.S. 14:39 (1950).
8. 165 La. 718, 115 So. 914 (1928) reversed on other grounds. Accord, State
v. Louviere, 169 La. 109, 124 So. 188 (1929).
9. 165 La. 718, 720, 115 So. 914 (1928).
10. 230 La. 327, 88 So.2d 387 (1956).
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Composition of the Grand Jury
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the venire and jury
lists constitutes a denial of due process and equal protection of
the laws to Negro defendants.11 These decisions are based on the
sound principle that impartial grand and petit juries, selected
without discrimination against members of his race, are neces-
sary to insure the defendant's right to a fair trial. It was not
surprising, therefore, for the Louisiana Supreme Court in State
v. Lea12 to hold that a white man was not denied his constitution-
al rights by the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand
jury which indicted him.
Short Form Indictments
By far the most significant decision rendered in the last term
of the Supreme Court in the field of Criminal Procedure was
that of State v. Straughan.18 In a six to three decision the court
declared that the part of the 1944 amendment 14 to Article 235 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "it shall
be sufficient to charge the defendant by using the name and ar-
ticle number of the offense committed" in cases of Criminal Code
crimes not covered by the specific short forms,15 was unconstitu-
tional. In so doing, the court overruled State v. Davis, 6 which
had held the provision constitutional. Chief Justice Fournet, in
a majority opinion which showed much painstaking research,
reasoned that 7 "all the essential facts necessary to describe the
nature and cause of the offense must be incorporated in the
initial criminal charge ... because the constitution requires that
all criminal prosecutions be by indictment or information"' 8 and
that the defendant "be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him."19 Chief Justice Fournet did not feel
11. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) ; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
12. 228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169 (1955).
13. 229 La. 1036, 87 So.2d 523 (1956), 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvEw 232 (1956).
Accord, State v. McQueen, 230 La. 55, 87 So.2d 727 (1956).
14. La. Acts 1944, No. 223, p. 661, discussed by author, Louisiana Legislation
of 1944, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 16-18 (1944).
15. Article 235 provides specific short form indictments for a number of well
understood crimes.
16. 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945), 6 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 716 (1946).
17. 229 La. 1036, 1072, 87 So.2d 523, 536 (1956).
18. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
19. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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that in crimes, such as gambling, which do not have a well-
understood meaning, the defendant's right to a bill of particulars
would satisfy the constitutional provisions. The full import of
the Straughan decision will be carefully studied by district at-
torneys and judges. While only future Supreme Court decisions
will completely settle the matter, the writer hazards a brief an-
alysis of the situation. It is very probable that the Louisiana
Supreme Court will continue to sustain the validity of specific
short forms for crimes having a well-defined meaning and scope,
such as murder,20 theft,2' aggravated rape,22 and manslaughter.2
The Chief Justice's opinion indicates a continued adherence to
the view that these forms sufficiently inform the accused of the
nature of the charge against him. However, the Supreme Court
has definitely drawn the line upon charging multifarious and
purely statutory crimes, such as gambling, by name and article
number.
Long Form Indictments
The long form indictment, used for charging those crimes for
which a special short form is not provided, "must state every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the offense, but
it need do no more, and it is immaterial whether the language of
the statute creating the offense, or words unequivocally convey-
ing the meaning of the statute, be used. '2 4 A number of 1955-56
decisions have construed the long form indictment provision so
as to achieve the liberality intended - rejecting ultra-technical
objections and simply determining whether the charge was suf-
ficent to inform the accused fully of the nature of the charge
against him. In State v. Ware25 the defendant had been convict-
ed under an indictment which alleged that he unlawfully sold in-
toxicating liquors for beverage purposes "in violation of an
ordinance of the Claiborne Parish Police Jury." In a motion in
arrest of judgment, defense counsel contended that the informa-
tion should have specifically stated that Claiborne Parish was
dry. The Supreme Court held that this contention was "unten-
able," stating that "a bill charging one with having committed
an act in violation of a prohibitory law, is equal to saying that
20. State v. White, 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931).
21. State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944).
22. State v. Chanet, 209 La. 410, 24 So.2d 670 (1946).
23. State v. Nichols, 216 La. 622, 44 So.2d 318 (1950).
24. LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
25. 228 La. 713, 84 So.2d 56 (1955).
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the act committed is prohibited by a specific law as charged
therein. '26 In State v. Wagner27 it was objected that the infor-
mation, charging a narcotic violation, was defective in alleging
that the drug was administered to persons under the age of sev-
enteen years, when the narcotic drug law made no reference to
the age of the victim. The Supreme Court treated the allegation
as surplusage, and affirmed the conviction on authority of Ar-
ticle 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Actually, the allega-
tion in the principal case was not adequately phrased. An
allegation of the victim's age would appear essential if the en-
hanced penalties for sales to persons under the age of twenty-
one were to be imposed.28 In State v. Peltier29 the Supreme Court
held that an allegation of guilty knowledge was not essential to
a valid information charging unlawful possession of narcotics.
Defense counsel had urged the Johnson"0 and Nicolosi3' decisions
for the proposition that "guilty knowledge" was an essential
ingredient of the crime which must be set forth in the informa-
tion. In rejecting this contention, Justice Hamiter declared, "The
cases cited by defense counsel plainly have reference only to the
general criminal intent or guilty knowledge ordinarily required
to be proved in obtaining convictions for most offenses. The
question of a specific intent was not involved therein. '3 2 Since
the crime involved requires only a general criminal intent, addi-
tional support for the holding comes from Article 234 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which states that "No indictment
shall be held insufficient for want of the averment of . . . the
word 'intentionally,' or . . . ." The word "intentionally" is gen-
erally employed to signify a general criminal intent.3 3
In State v. LaNasa3 4 the Supreme Court adopted a much more
technical approach. The accused was charged with violating a
statute that requires death certificates to "be typewritten in
26. 228 La. 713, 722, 84 So.2d 56, 59 (1955).
27. 229 La. 223, 85 So.2d 272 (1956).
28. LA. R.S. 40:981 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 682, p. 1219.
29. 229 La. 745, 86 So.2d 693 (1956).
30. State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24 (1955), 17 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW ... (1956).
31. State v. Nicolosi, 228 La. 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955).
32. 229 La. 745, 756, 86 So.2d 693, 697 (1956). Justice Hamiter continued,
"Inappropriate and not controlling here is State v. Kelly, 225 La. 495, 73 8o.2d
437. The statute defining the crime involved therein specifically recited that the
acts constituting the offense should be done 'knowingly.' No similar provision is
contained in the statute under which this defendant was charged."
33. LA. R.S. 14:11 (1950).
34. 229 La. 842, 87 So.2d 1 (1956).
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black type or written legibly in durable black ink. '35 The infor-
mation simply stated that the accused had failed "to write with
black ink on said certificate." In holding the information fatally
defective, the Supreme Court stated, "the gravamen of the of-
fense is not the failure to fill out a death certificate in black ink,
as charged in the Bill of Information, but the failure to legibly
fill such a certificate in durable black ink. '36 Justice McCaleb,
in an opinion which dissented on this point, spotted the weakness
of the majority holding when he stated "it is clear to me that the
charge that defendant did not use black ink at all in filling out
the certificate avers a violation thereof. If the ink is not black,
the law is breached even though it be durable. I have never
understood that it is sacramental to charge an accused in the
exact language of the statute. It is only necessary that the facts
alleged disclose a violation of law. '37
Filing the Information
In State v. Brazze 38 the Supreme Court held that the infor-
mation was "filed," as required by Article 5 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, when it was delivered to the clerk of court, al-
though it had not been endorsed and marked "filed" by the clerk.
Bill of Particulars
In a number of decisions the Supreme Court again had occa-
sion to repeat the well-settled rule that the validity of an indict-
ment is determined solely by what is contained within its four
corners, and the contents of a bill of particulars cannot serve to
create or remedy a defect therein.39
In State v. Butler4° an information charged that the accused
on a certain day in Iberia Parish illegally sold and delivered a
narcotic drug. The trial court refused the accused's motion for a
bill of particulars requesting information as to whom the nar-
cotics were sold and delivered, and as to where in the parish and
at what time the crime took place. The trial court based its rul-
35. LA. R.S. 40:154 (1950).
36. 229 La. 842, 845, 87 So.2d 1, 2 (1956).
37. Id. at 848, 87 So.2d at 3, citing LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
38. 229 La. 1091, 87 So.2d 609 (1956).
39. State v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 84 So.2d 601 (1955) ; State v. McQueen, 230
La. 55, 87 So.2d 727 (1956); State v. Straughan, 229 La. 1036, 87 So.2d 523
(1956).
40. 229 La. 788, 86 So.2d 906 (1956).
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ing on the ground that the information sought was in the nature
of advance factual information as to the state's evidence which
the accused was not entitled to demand. The Supreme Court, in
reversing the conviction, acknowledged that it was within the
sound discretion of the trial judge to grant or refuse a request
for a bill of particulars but held that he had abused his discre-
tion in this instance. The court was of the opinion that the infor-
mation requested was essential to the accused's defense, especial-
ly if he desired to urge an alibi. State v. Dugan,41 decided the
same day as the Butler case, involved an identical factual situa-
tion and holding. This time the court stressed the idea that when
one "is charged under the language of a statute that is so gen-
eral in its terms that it does not sufficiently inform the accused
of the nature and cause of the accusation" he is entitled to the
same liberality from the trial judge in granting a bill of partic-
ulars as is one who is charged under a short form of indictment.
Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
where several distinct offenses are disjunctively enumerated in
the same statute the offenses may be cumulated in the same
count and charged conjunctively. The application of the prin-
ciple of this article to situations where a bill of particulars is
sought is neatly illustrated by the case of State v. Mills. 42 There,
two defendants were charged with gambling, in that they con-
ducted and directly assisted in the conducting of a lottery as a
business. The gambling article of the Criminal Code 43 defines
that offense as "the intentional conducting or directly assisting
in the conducting as a business" of the activities described there-
in. The defendants, in a request for a bill of particulars, sought
to require the state to specify whether each was charged "with
conducting and operating a lottery, or only with assisting in the
operation of a lottery." The state answered that each was
charged with conducting and assisting in the conducting of a lot-
tery. On the authority of Article 122 this answer was deemed
sufficient.4 4 The court also drew support for this holding from
Article 24 of the Criminal Code, which abolishes the distinction
between a principal and an accessory.
41. 229 La. 668, 86 So.2d 528 (1956).
42. 229 La. 758, 86 So.2d 895 (1956).
43. LA. R.S. 14:90 (1950).
44. Accord, State v. Prince, 216 La. 989, 45 So.2d 366 (1950), discussed In
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term - Criminal
Law and Procedure, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 239-40 (1951).
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The Mills case also held that the defendant was not entitled
to information before trial as to the type of lottery involved, be-
cause the word lottery "is neither vague nor indefinite." As to
the other details sought by the defendant in a request for a bill
of particulars the court applied the well-settled rule that "the
state is not required to reveal in advance of the trial the facts
on which it will rely in seeking a conviction. '45
Scope of Lunacy Report
Article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
the court may appoint a lunacy commission to examine into the
defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime whenever
his mental condition at that time "becomes an issue in the cause."
In State v. Chinn46 the defendant after pleading not guilty re-
quested the court to appoint a lunacy commission to inquire into
the defendant's present mental condition. The trial court's order
appointing the lunacy commission directed the physicians to
examine into the present mental condition of the defendant and
also his mental condition at the time of the crime. After a hear-
ing on the defendant's present mental condition, the court con-
cluded that he was presently sane and should stand trial. De-
fendant then pleaded insanity at the time of the crime as a de-
fense. The Supreme Court, on rehearing,47 held that the order
of the judge was a "nullity, insofar as it directed the experts to
investigate appellant's mental condition at the time of the com-
mission of the crime, for the reason that his sanity had not be-
come an issue in the cause at that time. '48 However, the failure
of the defendant to object to the irregularities of the order either
at the sanity hearing or at the trial was held to amount to a
waiver of his right to raise the issue on appeal. The Chinn case
illustrates the desirability of a provision which would authorize
the trial judge to order a complete diagnosis of the defendant's
mental condition, including an opinion as to his present capacity
to stand trial and also an opinion as to his mental condition at
the time of the crime.49 Such a combination report serves a very
45. State v. Mills, 229 La. 758, 768, 86 So.2d 895, 899 (1956).
46. 229 La. 984, 87 So.2d 315 (1955).
47. On the original hearing the court had mistaken the facts to be that the
order of the judge in appointing the lunacy commission had limited the commis-
sion's inquiry to the defendant's present mental condition. When the true facts
were called to the court's attention, it granted a rehearing.
48. 229 La. 984, 1012, 87 So.2d 315, 325 (1956).
49. The difficulty raised by the Chinn case is partially avoided under section




practical purpose in cases where it appears that the insanity de-
fense may ultimately be raised, even though the defense is not
presently urged. It will be particularly helpful in cases where a
defendant, who was found presently insane and committed to an
institution, subsequently regains his mental powers and is
brought to trial. A delayed separate examination at this later
date may be seriously hampered by the fact that the evidence will
be sketchy and unreliable.
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty
Generally, it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge
whether or not to allow the accused to withdraw his plea of guilty
and to enter a plea of not guilty.50 However, Article 266.1 gives
the accused a right to withdraw his plea of guilty, even though
sentence has been imposed, in cases where the plea was entered
"within forty-eight hours after the arrest and incarceration or
after placing the accused party under bond." In such cases the
plea of guilty or the sentence shall be set aside upon motion by
the accused, if made within thirty days after the entering of the
plea or imposition of the sentence. In State v. Monix5 ' the two
defendants who were arrested in Oklahoma waived extradition
and were returned to Louisiana. More than forty-eight hours
after their arrest in Oklahoma, but less than forty-eight hours
after their return to Louisiana, they entered a plea of guilty to
four burglary charges and were sentenced immediately. Six days
thereafter, the defendants moved to set aside the guilty plea and
sentence, requesting that they be permitted to substitute a plea
of not guilty. It was held that "arrest and incarceration" as used
in Article 266.1 does not refer only to the arrest and incarcera-
tion in the parish where the plea is made. Since the plea of
guilty was entered more than forty-eight hours after the initial
arrest in Oklahoma, the general rule (rather than Article 266.1)
applied. Not finding an abuse in the trial court's discretion in
refusing to allow the defendants to withdraw their plea of guilty,
the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
Change of Plea and Effect
State v. Joyner5 2 presented the question of whether the min-
utes of the trial court, showing that the accused, who is pleading
50. LA. R.S. 15:266 (1950).
51. 229 La. 142, 85 So.2d 243 (1956). Accord, companion cases, State v. Rus-
sell, 229 La. 150, 85 So.2d 245 (1956) ; State v. Monix, 229 La. 150, 85 So.2d
246 (1956).
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not guilty, had previously withdrawn a plea of guilty, may be
admitted as evidence of a judicial confession. A minority of the
jurisdiction take the view that the plea of guilty is a judicial con-
fession of guilt and as such is entitled to greater weight than an
extra-judicial confession.5 3 Those jurisdictions, by this process
of reasoning, conclude that evidence of the prior withdrawal of a
plea of guilty is admissible as a judicial confession. However, as
pointed out by one writer,5 4 the plea of guilty is often only a
tactical move and not in reality an admission of guilt. Louisiana
is in line with the great weight of authority in holding that the
plea of guilty, after its withdrawal, is not admissible to show a
judicial confession of guilt. Under this view, the withdrawn plea
of guilty is considered as completely annulled and is of no evi-
dentiary effect.
Continuance
Article 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure places the
granting as refusal of a continuance in "the sound discretion of
the trial judge." An abuse of this discretion will be found only
in exceptional circumstances. No exceptional circumstance was
found in State v. Elias,5 5 where a continuance was sought when
the case came to trial by the defense counsel, who also represent-
ed each defendant in six other cases which were set to be tried
on the same day as the Elias case. The principal ground of the
motion appeared to have been that defense counsel relied upon
his realization that all cases could not be tried that day and upon
a statement, alleged to have been made by the district attorney,
that the Elias case would not be tried first. He therefore came to
court prepared only for the first case.
Another case in which no abuse of discretion was found in
the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance was State v.
Forsyth.5 6 There, a continuance was sought on the date of trial
on the basis of a medical certificate submitted by the defendant's
physician, which stated that the defendant had been under treat-
ment for diabetes, that he reported to the physician two days be-
fore trial with certain complaints, that he had high blood pres-
sure and that it was advisable to confine him to the hospital. The
52. 228 La. 927, 84 So.2d 462 (1955).
53. See Annot., 124 A.L.R. 1527 (1940).
54. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 302 (1947).
55. 229 La. 929, 87 So.2d 132 (1956).
56. 229 La. 690, 86 So.2d 536 (1956).
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trial court was of the opinion that the defendant had entered the
hospital for the specific purpose of avoiding trial, and took
further note of the fact that at the trial the defendant consulted
with his counsel from time to time and appeared to be completely
oriented and alert. Justice McCaleb pointed out that since the
defendant did not reenter the hospital until five days after the
trial, hospitalization must not have been so essential as had been
claimed.
Recusation of Trial Judge
Article 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
one of the causes of recusation of the trial judge is that he is re-
lated "to one of the attorneys or to the spouse of one of the at-
torneys within the second degree." In State v. Lea57 it was held
that the statute was not applicable to an attorney who was a pub-
lic officer representing the state by virtue of his office. There-
fore, a judge who was related within the second degree to an
assistant district attorney who aided in the earlier stages of the
proceedings was not required to recuse himself.
Voir Dire Examination
The purpose of a voir dire examination is not to see how much
law the prospective juror knows or to explain the law to him.
Rather, as is stated by Article 357, "the purpose of the exami-
nation of jurors is to ascertain the qualifications of the juror in
the trial of the case in which he has been tendered, and the ex-
amination shall be limited to that purpose." This principle was
applied in State v. Dabbs8 to uphold the trial judge's action in
refusing to allow the defense counsel to read from pertinent de-
cisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court to prospective jurors on
their voir dire examination. The trial judge's per curiam showed
that defense counsel had been permitted to read from the de-
cisions in question in his summation to the jury after the testi-
mony was concluded.
It is a well-settled rule in the Louisiana jurisprudence that a
prospective juror, on his voir dire, cannot be required to indicate
in advance what his verdict would be under a described state of
facts. In State v. Peltier59 the defense counsel recited a factual
57. 228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169 (1955).
58. 228 La. 960, 84 So.2d 601 (1955).
59. 229 La. 745, 86 So.2d 693 (1956).
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situation to the prospective jurors and then asked: "Would you
have any prejudice or bias against, or would there be anything
that would keep you from returning a verdict of not guilty?"
The trial court refused to allow the prospective juror to answer
this question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
question was clearly phrased so as to commit the prospective
juror in advance as to what his verdict would be under the pre-
scribed factual situation.
Opening Statement of the District Attorney
Article 333 requires that the state make an opening state-
ment explaining the nature of the charge and the evidence by
which it intends to establish that charge. In Louisiana this open-
ing statement is regarded as limiting the proof of the state, thus
making the state "show its hand" in advance of trial.60 As is
stated in State v. Jones6' the underlying purpose of the require-
ment of an opening statement by the district attorney "is to force
him to disclose state's evidence, not only to inform the court, the
jury and the defendant of what facts the state intends to prove,
but in fairness to permit the defendant to adequately present his
defense and avoid being taken by surprise." 62 In that case the
district attorney referred to a written statement made by the ac-
cused as an "admission." The defendant contended that the "ad-
mission" was in reality a confession and that, since there was no
mention of a "confession" in the state's opening statement, it
was inadmissible in evidence. In overruling this contention, both
the trial judge and the Supreme Court held that the writing was
really an "admission" as stated by the district attorney. The
Supreme Court significantly stressed the fact that the district
attorney had tracked the exact words of the "admission" in his
opening statement. The court declared, "Certainly, under such
a full disclosure it is inconceivable to us that the defendant was
not fully apprised of the evidence which the state intended to
prove." 3 Under this reasoning the court might well have reached
the same result, whether the written statement of the defendant
was technically an admission (as designated in the district at-
torney's opening statement) or a confession (as claimed by de-
fense counsel). Where the opening statement is treated as a
60. See Note, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 238 (1940).
61. 230 La. 356, 88 So.2d 655 (1956).
62. 88 So.2d 655, 658.
63. 88 So.2d 655, 658.
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limitation on the state's proof at the trial, it is important that the
courts adopt a liberal attitude regarding the details and com-
pleteness of the statement.
Improper Remarks of the District Attorney
Article 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that
counsel "must confine themselves to matters as to which evidence
has been received; and counsel shall refrain from any appeal to
prejudice." Some improper remarks are held "incurable" or
reversible error per se. In other cases the prejudicial effect may
be "cured" by a prompt admonition to the jury that they were
improper and should be disregarded.6 4 A case of curable im-
proper argument was presented in State v. Brossette,65 where the
district attorney in his final argument stated that the victim had
lost so much blood from the wound inflicted that he wrecked his
car on the way to the hospital and died of the injuries thus re-
ceived. Counsel for defense objected that the district attorney's
argument went beyond the evidence adduced at the trial and was
highly prejudicial, and asked the court to declare a mistrial. Ac-
cording to the trial judge's per curiam the fact of the fatal auto-
mobile wreck had been brought out at the trial, and so defense
counsel's claim was partially unfounded. However, Justice Haw-
thorne posited the case on a broader principle, i.e., that argu-
ments which go beyond the evidence of the case may be cured by
a prompt admonition of the jury to disregard them. "Extreme
cases," where the remark is incurable and the trial judge has no
alternative but to order a mistrial, would include such highly
prejudicial remarks as comments on the failure of the defendant
to take the stand"6 and appeals to racial prejudice.6 7
Special Charge - When Necessary to Give
When the defense has presented a charge to the court for its
ruling thereon, the judge must give the requested charge if it is
"wholly correct and wholly pertinent ... unless such charge re-
quire qualification, limitation or explanation."6 8 In State v.
D'ominquez69 the Supreme Court found certain requested charges
64. See Comment, Improper Remarks of the District Attorney, 10 LOUISIANA
LAw REVIEW 486 (1950).
65. 229 La. 420, 86 So.2d 87 (1956).
66. State v. Robinson, 112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904).
67. State v. Bessa, 115 La. 259, 38 So. 985 (1905).
68. LA. R.S. 15:390 (1950).
69. 230 La. 371, 88 So.2d 660 (1956).
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were in need of qualification, limitation, and explanation, and
were not wholly pertinent. It therefore held that the trial court
properly refused to give them. On the other hand, in State v.
Leonard70 the Supreme Court held that the requested charge,
which involved distinguishing between a confession and an ad-
mission, was "wholly correct and wholly pertinent." It was
wholly correct because it was couched in the language of the
statute defining admissions and confessions. 71 It was wholly
pertinent because the statement made by the accused had been
referred to as a confession in the presence of the jury and the
defendant was contending that it was an admission of facts
merely tending to establish guilt.
Instruction on Lesser Responsive Verdicts
It is well settled that attempted possession of narcotics is a
lesser and included grade of the crime and unlawful possession of
narcotics.7 2 There is considerable confusion in the Louisiana
jurisprudence, however, as to whether the general mandatory
duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury upon the law ap-
plicable to lesser and included offenses78 applies where the charge
is unlawful possession of narcotics and there is no evidence in
support of the lesser attempt verdict. In State v. Espinosa4 the
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury as to the lesser attempt crime. In that case the defendant
had admitted the actual obtaining of the narcotic drugs. In the
recent case of State v. Marshfield,75 where no such admission ap-
pears to have been made, the court held that the trial judge had
committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury con-
cerning the lesser crime of attempted possession of narcotics.
In his per curiam the trial judge had stated that the special
charge on attempted possession "was refused for the reason that
there was no evidence adduced as to any attempt to commit the
crime. ' 7 6 While the Marshfield decision may be justified by the
seemingly mandatory language of the responsive verdict article, 77
70. 230 La. 414, 88 So.2d 804 (1956).
71. LA. R.S. 15:449 (1950).
72. State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604 (1950).
73. LA. R.S. 15:386 (1950).
74. 223 La. 520, 66 So.2d 323 (1953).
75. 229 La. 55, 85 So.2d 28 (1956).
76. Id. at 57, 85 So.2d at 29.
77. LA. R.S. 15:386 (1950) : "Whenever the indictment sets out an offense
including other offenses of less magnitude or grade the judge ahall charge the jury
the law applicable to all offenses of which the accused could be found guilty under
the indictment." (Emphasis added.)
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it is out of line with the rule followed in virtually every other
jurisdiction.7 8 It is entirely illogical, making for jury confusion
and compromise verdicts, to instruct the jury concerning possible
lesser verdicts which are entirely unsupported by the evidence
adduced at the trial. The general rule, as to submission of lesser
included offenses to the jury, is stated in Section 1.08 (5) of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code as follows: "The
Court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included of-
fense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the in-
cluded offense."79 Instructions with respect to lesser included of-
fenses where there is no basis for finding the defendant innocent
of the crime charged and yet guilty of the lesser crime, as in the
Marshfield case, only serves to confuse the jury and to invite an
unwarranted compromise verdict.
Delay in Filing Motion for New Trial
Article 505 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that
a motion for a new trial must be filed and disposed of before sen-
tence. In State v. Washington0 one of the two defendants, after
being charged with murder, informed the court that he was un-
able to employ counsel. The court thereupon appointed a counsel
to represent him. At the trial the other defendant was repre-
sented by counsel whom he had retained. After the defendants
had been found guilty and sentenced to death, new defense coun-
sel, other than the ones who had represented the defendants at
the trial, moved for a new trial. They contended that certain acts,
of both omission and commission, which occurred in the trial
court, were so prejudicial to the defendants as to amount to a
denial of due process. In support of this claim it was alleged that
none of the usual defenses were urged and no bills of exceptions
were reserved during the trial on the defendants' behalf. The
Supreme Court upheld the" trial court's refusal to grant a new
trial and based its decision on Article 505. A lengthy quotation
from State ex rel. Sheffield v. Ellis"' was also relied on in sup-
port of the decision. That case was similar to the Washington
case, although involving more aggravated facts. In the Sheffield
78. For a complete analysis of the problem, see Comment, 17 LoUIsIANA LAW
REVIEW 211 (1956).
79. Tentative Draft No. 5 (1956).
80. 230 La. 181, 88 So.2d 19 (1956).
81. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 41,689.
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case the Louisiana Supreme Court in denying certiorari affirmed
the trial court's action in denying a new trial, because the motion
for the new trial had been filed after sentence was imposed.
However, after the United States Supreme Court denied writs
applied for on the defendant's behalf, 82 the defendant proceeded
by habeas corpus in the federal district court88 and Sheffield was
released on the ground that he had been denied due process of
law. The federal court pointed out that the Louisiana Supreme
Court "could have granted the relief sought, by ordering a hear-
ing on the due process questions in the lower court. '8 4 In view
of the fact that a death sentence was imposed, it would appear
that the Supreme Court in the Washington case could have, with
consistency, relaxed the provisions of the Code as it has done
in previous cases, even if the due process requirements had not
been violated.88
Appeal- Method of Taking
In order for the Supreme Court to pass on irregularities that
have occurred in the trial court, the defendant must reserve an
exception to the trial court's rulings on his objection and annex
to the exception the facts and circumstances upon which the rul-
ing complained of was made. In State v. Peltier,86 since the de-
fendant had not included in his bill of exceptions the testimony
showing the facts and circumstances leading to the introduction
of certain evidence, the Supreme Court refused to pass on the
merits of his exception to the trial court's ruling on the admissi-
bility of the evidence complained of.
In a number of 1955-1956 cases, the Supreme Court refused
to consider alleged trial irregularities on appeal because the mo-
tion for appeal had not been made within ten judicial days after
the rendition of judgment8 7 and because the bill of exceptions
had not been perfected and signed by the trial judge before the
motion of appeal was granted.88 In State v. Harrell,9 however,
82. Sheffield v. Louisiana, 348 U.S. 850 (1954).
83. United States ex rel. Sheffield v. Waller, 126 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. La.
1954).
84. Id. at 537, 543, n. 15, citing LA. CoNsT. art. VII, §§ 2, 10, relating to
the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction.
85. See State v. Richard, 203 La. 722, 14 So.2d 615 (1943) and State v. Har-
rell, 228 La. 434, 82 So.2d 701 (1955). Both of these cases are discussed page 420
infra.
86. 229 La. 745, 86 So.2d 693 (1956).
87. State v. Elias, 229 La. 1032, 87 So.2d 521 (1956).
88. State v. Perez, 228 La. 796, 84 So.2d 195 (1955), holding that the Irreg-
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the Supreme Court considered a bill of exceptions reserved by a
defendant who had received a death sentence, although he failed
to present the bill of exceptions for the trial court's signature be-
fore an appeal was taken. In State v. Richard,90 in a somewhat
analogous situation, the Supreme Court had previously refused
to apply the appeal requirements of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure rigidly to one who had been sentenced to death. There
the defendant's bills of exceptions were considered, although he
had failed to make a motion for a new trial which Article 559
requires as a condition precedent to a new trial being granted
on appeal.
There is one situation in which the reservation of a bill of
*exceptions is unnecessary to provide a basis for the Supreme
Court's appellate review. This is when the trial court has over-
ruled a motion in arrest of judgment based on an error patent
on the face of the record. In such a case the alleged irregularity
is already in the record, and a bill of exceptions would serve no
practical purpose. State v. Ware9 was such a case. Although no
bills of exceptions had been timely perfected, the Supreme Court
reviewed the trial court's overruling of the defendant's motion
in arrest of judgment, which was based on an allegedly defective
indictment. A defective indictment is "discoverable by the mere
inspection of the pleadings without any inspection of the evi-
dence." 92
ularity was not cured by the trial judge's signing the bills subsequent to the ap-
peal; State v. Ware, 228 La. 713, 84 So.2d 56 (1955). Accord, State v. Lovoi, 228
La. 638, 83 So.2d 656 (1955), where no bill of exceptions had been perfected.
89. 228 La. 434, 82 So.2d 701 (1955).
90. 203 La. 722, 14 So.2d 615 (1943), discussed by author in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1942-19438 Term - Criminal Law and Procedure,
5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 574 (1944).
91. 228 La. 713, 84 So.2d 56 (1955).
92. LA. R.S. 15:503 (1950) defining errors patent on the face of the record.
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